In SV94], multipermutations are introduced as formalization of perfect di usion. The aim of this paper is to show that the concept of multipermutation is a basic tool in the design of dedicated cryptographic functions, as functions that do not realize perfect di usion may be subject to some clever cryptanalysis in which the ow of information is controlled throughout the computation network. We give two cases of such an analysis.
Firstly, we show how to build collisions for MD4 restricted to its rst two rounds 
MD4 restricted to its last two rounds is detailed in BB91
]. An other unpublished attack on the rst two rounds has been found by Merkle (see the introduction of BB91]). This attack does not produce a real collision, but di erent digests very close to each other (according to the Hamming distance). Here, we present a new attack which is based on the fact that an inert function is not a multipermutation. This attack requires less than one tenth of a second on a SUN workstation. Moreover, the same attack applied to the full MD4 compression function produces two di erent digests close to each other. Secondly, we show how to develop a known plaintext attack to a variant of SAFER K-64, in which we replace the permutation exp 45 by a (weaker) one. SAFER is a six rounds encryption function introduced in Mas93]. It uses a byte-permutation (namely, exp 45 in the group of nonzero integers modulo 257) for confusion. If we replace exp 45 by a random permutation P (and log 45 by P ?1 ), we show that in 6:1% of the cases, there exists a known plaintext attack faster than exhaustive search. Furthermore, this attack can be implemented for the function restricted to 4 rounds. This attack is based on the linear cryptanalysis introduced in Mat93] and recently gave way to the rst experimental attack of the full DES function in Mat94].
Multipermutations
In SV94], multipermutations with 2 inputs and 2 outputs are introduced. Here, we propose to generalize to any number of inputs and outputs.
De nition A (r; n)-multipermutation over an alphabet Z is a function f from Z r to Z n such that two di erent (r+n)-tuples of the form (x; f(x)) cannot collide in any r positions. Thus, a (1; n)-multipermutation is nothing but a vector of n permutations over Z. A (2; 1)-multipermutation is equivalent to a latin square 2 . A (2; n)-multipermutation is equivalent to a set of n two-wise orthogonal latin squares 3 . Latin squares are widely studied in DK74].
An equivalent de nition says that the set of all (r + n)-tuples of the form (x; f(x)) is an error correcting code with minimal distance n + 1, which is the maximal possible. In the case of a linear function f, this is the de nition of MDS codes: codes which reach Singleton's bound. For more details about MDS codes, see MS77]. More generally, a (r; n)-multipermutation is equivalent to a ((#Z) r ; r + n; #Z; r)-orthogonal array 4 . 2 a latin square over a nite set of k elements is a k k matrix with entries from this set such that all elements are represented in each column and each row. A multipermutation performs a perfect di usion in the sense that changing t of the inputs changes at least n ? t + 1 of the outputs. If a function is not a multipermutation, one can nd several values such that both few inputs and few outputs are changed. Those values can be used in cryptanalysis as is shown in two examples below. This motivates the use of multipermutations in cryptographic functions.
The design of multipermutations over a large alphabet is a very di cult problem, as the design of two-wise orthogonal latin squares in a well-known di cult one. The only powerful method seems to use an MDS code combined with several permutations at each coordinate.
In the particular case of 2 inputs, it is attractive to choose latin squares based on a group law: if we have a group structure over Z, we can seek permutations , , , , and such that
is a permutation, as it will be su cient to get a multipermutation. Unfortunately, it is possible to prove that such permutations exist only when the 2-Sylow subgroup of Z is not cyclic 5 , using a theorem from HP55]. More precisely, they do not exist when the 2-Sylow subgroup is cyclic. They are known to exist in all solvable groups in which the 2-Sylow subgroup is not cyclic, but the existence in the general case is still a conjecture. Hence, Z should not have a cyclic group structure. For instance, we can use the GF (2) n group structure for n > 1. Such multipermutations are proposed in SV94].
In MD4, the group structure of GF (2) 32 is used, but some functions are not multipermutations. On the other hand, in SAFER, the group structure of ZZ 256 , which is cyclic, is used, so without multipermutations. where v i is an Initial Value, and h x (v) is C x (v) + v (x is the key and v is the message to encrypt).
Here we intend to build a single block collision to h(v i ), that is to say two blocks x and x 0 such that C x (v i ) = C x 0 (v i ). It is obvious that this can be used to build collisions to the hash function. So, we only have to recall the de nition of the function C x (v).
The value v is represented as 4 integers a, b, c and d (coded with 32 bits), and the key x is represented as 16 integers x 1 ; : : : ; x 16 . The initial de nition of C uses three rounds i = 1; 2; 3. The gure 1 shows the computational graph of a single round i. It uses a permutation i and some boxes B j i . B j i is fed with a main input, a block integer x i (j) and three side inputs. If p is the main input and q, r and s are the side inputs (from top to bottom), the output is where R is the right circular rotation, i;j and k i are constants and f i is a particular function. In the following, we just have to know that f 2 is the bit-wise majority function, 1 is the identical permutation, and 2 = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 5 9 13 2 6 10 14 3 represents the xor operation on 8 bits integers. + is the addition modulo 256. P is a permutation over the set of all integers de ned in the SAFER design. Q is the inverse permutation of P . L is a linear permutation over the algebraic structure of the ring ZZ 256 , as L(x; y) = (2:x + y; x + y) (mod 256):
In the original design, P is the exponentiation in base 45 modulo 257: all integers from 1 to 256 can be coded with 8 bits (256 is coded as zero) and represent the group of all invertible integers modulo 257. 45 is a generator of this group.
In practical implementations, we have to store the table of the permutation P . So, there is no reason to study SAFER with this particular permutation. Here, we will show that this choice is a very good one, as for 6:1% of all possible permutations, there exists a known plaintext attack faster than exhaustive search.
Linear cryptanalysis of SAFER
The permutation L is not a multipermutation, as we have L 1 (x + 128; y) = L 1 (x; y) for all x and y (where L 1 denotes the rst output of L). So, we have pairs of 4-tuples (x; y; L(x; y)) at Hamming distance 2. Actually, there are no (2; 2)-multipermutations which are linear over ZZ 256 as its 2-Sylow subgroup is cyclic (it is itself here). We can use this property of L 1 by a dual point of view noticing that some information about L 1 (x; y) only depends on y. Namely, we have L 1 (x; y) 1 = y 1 where is the inner product over (ZZ 2 ) 8 , so, y 1 is the least signi cant bit of y. Similarly, we have (L 1 (x; y) 1) (L 2 (x; y) 1) = x 1 Let us denote F the function de ned by the three bottom layers on gure 2 (layers which uses L in a round). If x 1 ; : : : ; x 8 are the inputs of a round, the outputs are F (y 1 ; : : : ; y 8 ) where y 1 = P (x 1 k 1 1 ) + k 2 1 , ... We notice that if F (y 1 ; : : : ; y 8 ) = (z 1 ; : : : ; z 8 ), we have a 2-2 linear characteristic (z 3 1) (z 4 1) = (y 3 1) (y 4 1) (this means there is a linear dependance using 2 inputs and 2 outputs of F ). There are 5 other 2-2 linear characteristics:
(z 2 1) (z 6 1) = (y 2 1) (y 6 1) (z 5 1) (z 7 1) = (y 5 1) (y 7 1) (z 3 1) (z 7 1) = (y 5 1) (y 6 1) (z 5 1) (z 6 1) = (y 2 1) (y 4 1) (z 2 1) (z 4 1) = (y 3 1) (y 7 1):
If L were a multipermutation, the smallest characteristics would be a-b ones such that a+b = 6. This means more information would be required in a cryptanalysis.
Let q denote Prob x x 1 = P (x) 1]? 1 2
, the bias which measures the dependence between the least ligni cant bits of P (x) and x. We get the same bias with Q in place of P . If (x 1 ; : : : ; x 8 ) is a plaintext, if y 1 = P (x 1 k 1 ), y 2 = Q(x 2 + k 2 ), ..., To get a probability greater than 95%, we have to reach = 2 : the good (k 3 ; k 4 ) is accepted with probability 95% and the bad ones are rejected with probability 12 . So, for all permutations P which are biased (q 6 = 0), this attack is faster than exhaustive search. For jqj 2 ?4 , the attack can be implemented.
The analysis of the distribution of q shows that we have jqj 2 ?4 for 6:1% of the possible permutations P (see appendix B). We have q = 0 for only 9:9% of the permutations. Unfortunately (or fortunately), for the P chosen by Massey, we have q = 0, so, the weakness of the di usion phase is balanced by the strength of the confusion phase. Actually, q = 0 is a property of all exponentiations which are permutations (see appendix B).
Further analysis can improve this attack. It is possible to use tighter computations. We can look for a better tradeo between the workload and the probability of success. It is also possible to use several characteristics to decrease N (for more details, see KR94]). Actually, it is possible to decrease N by a factor of 64.
Conclusion
In MD4, we have shown that the fact that f 2 is not a multipermutation allows to mount an attack. Similarly, in SAFER, the di usion function is not a multipermutation. This allows to imagine another attack. This shows that we do need multipermutations in the design of cryptographic primitives. Research in this area should be motivated by this general statement.
